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Summary
This report ass ess es a set of criteria for providing
development aid in the form of general budget support
and sector support. The criteria are suggested by the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and relate to good
governance, structural reforms, the budget process,
accounting, auditing and reporting. The criteria are
assessed on the background of a discussion of how general
budget and sector support work from a macroeconomic
view. In addition an analysis of the workings of such
support in combination with the most common
conditions on which it is given is provided. It is
recommended that budget or sector support should be
given when the recipient government has adequate
administrative capacity. Macroeconomic policy measures
should be left to the recipient government in cooperation
with the IMF in order to ensure internal consistency.
Budget and sector support should be given under the
condition of accountability and transparency. If these
conditions are not fulfiled, debt relief may be considered
as an alternative to sector or budget support.
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Overview and recommendations
This report assesses a set of criteria for providing development aid in the form of
general budget support and sector support. The criteria are suggested by the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and relate to good governance,
structural reforms, the budget process, accounting, auditing and reporting. The report
is commssioned by MFA, but the responsibilty for the views and recommendations
herein rests with the author.
Westar by raising some general issues related to transfers to least developed
countries. We first argue that under any circumstances, new projects should not be
approved unless existing structures are in good working condition. Second, we argue
that borrowing should not take place unless the return on the loan-funded project is at
least as high as the cost of the loan. Third, we argue that donors must ascertain that
total transfers to the recipient country and corresponding programs are compatible
with an effective and sustainable public sector. Finally, we argue that sector and
budget support should be given when the recipient government has adequate
institutional capacity.
Next, we provide an analysis of the macroeconomic impact of budget support. The
interdependency of macroeconomic policy measures is emphasized. Therefore, we
argue that macroeconomic policy making should be left to at the most one decision-
making body for each policy measure. We go on to show how the different policy
measures work under different policy regimes, and how transfers affect the
stabilization efforts made by the recipient government. Two important conc1usions
are made: First, transfers have an expansionary effect on the economy, and often lead
to a widening of the trade deficit. Second, transfers under the most common
conditionalities imposed by ESAP programs are in principle equivalent to debt relief.
Therefore, debt relief could be considered as an alternative to sector programs and
budget support when the institutional capacity of the recipient government is weak.
The following recommendations regarding the suggested criteria for sector and budget
support are made:
The good governance criteria: The criteria should apply to all recipients of
Norwegian development aid, independently of the form the aid is given in.
The structural reforms criteria: It is sufficient to require that the recipient government
has entered an agreement with the IMF on structural reforms.
The budget process: The criteria imposed should be related to accountabilty and
transparency, not to any particular budgetar system.
Accounting and auditing: The conditions related to accounting and auditing should
be emphasized and receive the highest priority. Reliable accounting and auditing
should be made unconditional requirements for the public sector as a whole.
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1 The mandate
The mandate for this report is to look at a set of suggested criteria for providing
development aid in the form of general budget support or general sector support and
assess the suitability of the criteria. The criteria are as follows:
Good governance:
. The country should observe international agreements on human rights;
. The country should be a democracy, or at least in a process of democratization;
. The country should be fighting corruption.
Structural reforms:
. The country must have entered an agreement with the IMF on structural reforms;
. There must exist a policy framework paper (PFP) which summarizes the country' s
policies on social and economic reforms and lays out the structural reforms which
the donors have agreed to fund.
. The government must be committed to the above mentioned agreements.
The budget process:
. The recipient country must have a coordinated budget process established within
responsible departments. The budget process should entail the entire public
sector. The budget proeess must facilitate the operationalization of priorities.
. A process aiming at incorporating all donor funding in the budget must have been
initiated.
. The budget process must be linked to a multi year budget. This should contain a
framework for long-term planning and the extrapolation of future current
expenditure resulting from investment projects. At least such a framework must
be under preparation.
. There must be a system in place which ensures that budgeted funds are disbursed
to spending ageneies.
. There must be a system in place which ensures that each spending agency adheres
to the budget ceilings and that embezzlements are prevented.
Accounting and auditing:
. The recipient country must have an accounting system which corresponds to the
budget system. Accounts must be prepared shortly after the fiscal year has ended.
. The sectors which receive Norwegian sector support must establish systems for
reporting results and transactions in such away that it is possible to undertake
sound and complete accounting and auditing. Such systems must at least be under
planning for the entire public sector
. The public sector accounts must incorporate all public sector activities and give an
accurate picture of the public sector's expenditures and revenues. They must be
sufficiently detailed to show the resources avaIlable to the sector program in
question and the disbursements on each item.
. Discrepancies between the budget and the accounts should not reflect a systematic
lack of budget discipline.
. The government accounts must show at a reasonable leve! of detail the funds
going to sectors not involved in sector programs.
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. Auditing must be performed by an institution independent of the spending
agencies, inc1uding the ministry of finance. The audited accounts must be
prepared according to international standards and must be completed within a
reasonable period of time.
. Where the public sector undertakes off-budget activities, a consolidated budget
and accounting must be prepared.
Sector reports:
. The responsible deparments must prepare or plan to prepare performance
indicators for the sector engaged in sector investment programs.
. The responsible departments must prep are or plan to prepare a system for
reporting obtained results and achievements to donors. This system must as far as
possible correspond with the needs of the recipient country.
During the assessment, we are asked to look at:
. The leve! of detail;
. the realism given the information available;
. whether the criteria introduce additional procedures on the par of the recipient;
. whether the recipient is capable of adjusting to the criteria within a period of 2-3
years; and
. whether the conditions can prevent mismanagement of donor funds.
1.1 Interpretation of the mandate
The criteria for giving general budget support are very much dependent on the
objectives of such support. Since one of the suggested criteria is that the recipient has
entered an agreement with the !M on a reform program, we assume that the countries
under consideration for budget support are among the 35 countries currently under an
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with the IMF. The majority of these
countries are least developed countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Fisher 1997, Abed et.
aL. 1998), and a common feature is a relatively weak administrative and analytical
capabilty. This assumption has important bearings on our recommendations.
Structural adjustment programs usually involve adjusting government expenditure to
sustainable levels given the revenue potential. In addition, improving resource
allocation and efficiency within the public sector are important objectives of the
ESAF programs. Combined with a sound monetary policy these measures are
expected to stabilize the economy. In particular, they are expected to bring down
inflation. Finally, liberalization of intern al and external trade are usually part of the
program in order to induce a more efficient resource allocation in the economy as a
whole. The structural adjustment programs in all these respects build on generally
accepted principles for macroeconomic management.
The pre-ESAF situation was characterized by highly distorted economies with
substantial imbalances. In fact, the average government deficit amounted to 13.8
percent of GDP for the ESAF countries before the program was initiated (Abed et. aL.
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1998). In addition the current account deficit was on (unweighted) average about 5.5
percent of GDP in the countries which entered structural adjustment agreements with
the IMF during the period 1986-1988.1 The average masks a large variation from a
current account surplus of 3.3 percent of GDP in the Gambia to deficits of close to 17
percent of GDP in Mali and Malawi. In comparison, the current account deficit in
Thailand in 1996 was about 8.5 percent of GDP. A deficit of this magnitude had been
sustained for several years in Thailand. It was to a large extent financed through
short-term capital flows. This put the Thai economy in a vulnerable position.
Combined with a loss of confidence in the economy this is widely believed to have
triggered the financial and currency crisis in 1997.
Both at the time the structural adjustment packages were introduced and now with the
additional experience from the Asian financial crisis, it was clear that "business as
usual" is not an option in the face of huge and accumulating macroeconomic
imbalances. In this situation the necessary adjustment process produces winners and
losers and may be painful for the latter. Structural adjustment programs are therefore
usually combined with extended credit from the IMF and grants and loans from
bilateral aid agencies. In this report we assume that one important objective with
general budget support and sector support is to bolster structural adjustment while
shielding crucial social expenditure. In addition the donors emphasize the objective
of promoting recipient ownership of the programs related to sector support. The
recipient is hence expected to initiate and run the projects and programs according to
their own development priorities and strategies.
2 General considerations
2.1 Forms of development sid
The most common form of development aid is loans and grants to particular
investment projects. In the early days of development assistance, project grants and
loans totally dominated. However, a growing dissatisfaction with such aid emerged as
the projects did not lead to the expected econoinc growth (World Bank 1995). The
problem was that even where individual projects were considered reasonably
successful, the macroeconomic impact appeared to be insignificant. This micro-macro
paradox has been widely discussed in the literature.2 As a consequence of the meager
results on the macroeconomic level, a gradual shift in focus and emphasis towards the
macro level arose. Development aid in the form of import support and general budget
support were introduced as a response to the shift in focus and rapidly increased their
share of total transfers.
General budget support and import support are equivalent if foreign exchange is not
rationed and trade is free. In that case importers buy the foreign exchange provided by
donors at the going exchange rate. The proceeds from sales of foreign exchange
accrue to the government in the same way as budget support. In principle the same
1 Author's ca1culations based on IMF (1998).
2 See for example White (1992) for a survey focusing on the macroeconornc impact of aid.
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reasoning applies if foreign exchange is rationed due to an overvalued exchange rate.
In this case, however, donors and recipient governments can influence the allocation
of scarce foreign exchange. ff rationing is effective, it constitutes an additional policy
measure for allocating resources to priority areas also in the private sector. However,
rationing also creates distortions and rent-seeking behavior. In order to minimize
these negative effects, both budget support and import support come with a host of
conditionalities which aim at ensuring a more efficient resource allocation, at least
within the public sector.
General budget support or import support did not entirely measure up to expectations.
For example, it turne d out to be difficult to collect the full amount of counterpart
funds in several countries. That being the case, importers did not pay the full price of
imports. As a consequence, local producers were put at a great disadvantage
compared to imports. Sector investment programs (SIPs) were then designed in order
to improve performance. The SIPs aim at ensuring that the sectors thought to be most
critical for economic development receive adequate resources. At the same time
recipient ownership and initiative are encouraged. Finally, an important argument in
favor of SIPs is that they are supposed to reduce bureaucracy and administrative
burden.
SIPs do not resolve all the incentive problems, however. Therefore they too come
with an aray of conditionalities. A number of performance indicators have been
developed in order to monitor performance related to the conditions. Initially,
conditions came mainly from the multilateral donors, as part and parcel of the ESAF
programs. But bilateral donors have followed suit during the 1990s, imposing their
own conditions. Recipient governments hence face an increasing number of policy
conditions related to budget and sector support (Killck 1993). The reduced
administrative burden of not having to confront a host of donors with different
procedures at a project lev el may then be parly offset by new procedures. This is
particularly the case when donors impose conditions in an uncoordinated way and the
conditions as a result are internally inconsistent. Donor coordination, preferably by
the recipient country, is therefore of utmost importance if SIPs are to improve the
efficiency of development aid.
This very brief description of the changing forms of development aid ilustrates, in our
view, that there are certain problems and paradoxes related to development aid which
occur irrespective of the form in which aid is provided. We suspect that they wil not
go away as a result of a more detailed and scientific approach to development lending
as reflected in the conditions and performance indicators mentioned above.
Expectations as to what budget support can achieve where other forms of aid have
failed should therefore be realistic. The most central of these problems are further
elaborated below.
2.2 Loans or grants; investment or current expenditure?
It is a general principle of economic prudence both in households, the private business
sector and the public sector that borrowing should only be for investment purposes.
This has also been a guiding principle for development aid. Thus, a condition for
structural adjustment lending has been that local resources finance current
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expenditure. By the same token, ESAF agreements usually involve shifting resources
from the recurrent to the development budget in order to ensure that donor funds are
used for investment.
Distinguishing between current and investment expenditure was easy when
investment was defined as the accumulation of physical capital. As human capital has
gained prominenee in development and growth theory, the definition of investment
expenditure has become less clear-cut. Recent developments in growth theory find
that human capital accumulation is the engine of growth and that investment in
physical capital plays a secondar role, or follows as a response to human capital
accumulation (Lucas 1993). Expenditure assumed to contribute to the accumulation
of human capital can be considered as investment according to this theory.
Expenditure on education and health probably at least parly qualify as investment in
human capital, and could be financed by borrowing.
Whichever way investment is defined, borrowing should not take place unless the
expected economic rate of return on the investment is at least as high as the cost of
obtaining the resources. The return depends on the absorption capacity of the
recipient country and is not likely to be influenced by how development is funded.
In practice, development lending has led to a tendency to favor new projects at the
expense of the operation and maintenance of existing infrastructure, paricularly in the
least developed countries (Tanzi 1990). It appears therefore that the volume of
investment has been higher than what could be sustained by local resources. Jenkins
(1997) has studied World Bank lending in this perspective. He found that the Bank
did not assess the implications of investment projects for future current expenditure
properly. He also argues that both donors and the recipient government have neglected
financial viability in project appraisals until very recently.
The ESAF programs aim at addressing the problem of financial viability by
incorporating both the revenue and the expenditure side of the budget. In addition,
conditions on all other relevant policy measures are inc1uded in order to ensure
stabilzation of the economy and sustainabilty of the reforms. However, the
assumptions on the resources which can be raised from local sources may be on the
optimistic side in these programs. In an assessment of experience with ESAF
programs, the IMF finds that revenue mobilization has fallen behind targets,
particularly in the countries with the lowest local revenue/GDP ratio (Abed et. aL.
1998). These findings underline the importanee of incorporating careful financial
viabilty analysis in the SIPs.
Even in the absence of rigorous analysis of financial viability, a simple general rule
applies: new investment projects should be approved only if existing investments are
in good working condition. 3 When this criterion is fulfiled, support may be given in
the form of loans. IT not, aid should preferably be given as grants aiming at operating
and maintaining existing structures. In the latter case it is of paricular importance to
3 Provided that the investments were not "white elephants" in the first place. See Tanzi (1990) for
further discussion.
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have a realistic time schedule for the transfer of financial responsibility to the
recipient country.
2.3 Fungibilty
The fungibilty problem of development assistance has been discussed at length in the
literature. Usually it is seen as a problem that development assistance is used for
projects which would or could have been implemented even in the absence of
development assistance. Local revenue, which would otherwise have been spent on
the donor-funded project is then spent on other projects or programs, or not collected
at alL. A recent study of the fungibility of aid (Feyzioglu et. aL. 1998) finds that only a
third of foreign grants and about two thirds of concessionary loans are us ed for
government spending in a sample of 38 countries. The rest is us ed for tax relief. This
is an efficiency problem only if local resources are better spent by government than by
those who benefit from the tax relief. In a smaller sample of 14 countries no evidence
of fungibility was found.
Turning to the distribution of aid on recurrent and investment expenditure, it appears
that between two thirds and three quarters are actually spent on current expenditure.
Again loans are less fungible in this respect than grants (Feyzioglu et. aL. 1998).
Recall, however from our previous discussion that expenditure on human capital
accumulation may qualify as investment expenditure. The diversion of funds from
investment to recurrent expenditure may therefore not necessarily be a problem.
Finally, fungibility is a problem if local resources are diverted to projects thought to
be wasteful, for example sophisticated weapons systems. However, fungibilty at the
sector or project level is not a problem from an efficiency point of view when donors
prefer to fund projects of top priority to the recipient, and as a result, the recipient can
afford additional projects further down on the priority list. laricularly when the latter
projects are economically and financially viable and contribute to deve10pment. In
this case fungibility is an indication of efficient economic management.
When resources are fungible, transfers are not likely to affect total resource allocation
much.4 This is an argument for providing general budget support to developing
countries which have fairly well managed public sectors, and development strategies
acceptable to the donor(s).5
In the same way as a high degree of fungibilty has positive aspects, a low degree of
fungibilty has negative aspects. Thus, when donors fund high priority projects that
the recipient government can not afford, the recipient government almost per
definition operates at an activity leve! which it, at least at the outset, could not sustain
in the absence of donor funds. A key question then is when, or even if one can
realistically expect the recipient government to take over the funding of the program
in question. An indicative answer to this can be obtained by noting that investment
projects and programs always have implications for future current expenditure. IT
4 It may, however, affect the exchange rate. Jf so, it wil also affect resource allocation, but that wil
happen through price signals in the market.
5 Jf development aid is needed at all in such countries.
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current expenditure increases faster than GDP, then government expenditure increases
as a share of GDP. Donor-funded, non-fungible projects/programs may then
contribute to the expansion of the public sector beyond what is desirable or intended,
irrespective of whether aid is given as project lending/grants, import support or sector
support.
There is an unambiguous negative correlation between economic growth and
government consumption relative to GDP (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Marin
1995). The poorest and most ai d-dependent region in the word, sub-Saharan Africa,
has generally a much higher ratio of public expenditure to GDP than developing
countries elsewhere, and much higher than today' s developed countries when they had
a similar level of GDP per capita.6 The region has also experienced slower growth.
Assuming that the negative correlation between public expenditure as a share of GDP
and growth involves some degree of causality, donors need to consider how much
additional activity they should fund. This has to be evaluated against a presumption
on what is the optimal size of the public sector.7 SIDA (1995) realizes this and does
not require that its funding is additional, while the Netherlands (1996) considers it to
be important that aid is additional or non-fungible.
On the background of this discussion we would argue that the fungibility problem
does not warant too much concern from the donors ' point of view. The crucial point
is the absorption capacity of the recipient country - in particular its capacity for
efficient resource allocation.
2.4 Is general budgetJsector support appropriate when the recipient
has a weak or a strong institutional capacity?
The Netherlands considers budget or sector support as a suitable form of development
assistance when the recipient country has astrong institutional capacity (The
Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996). ECON (1996) argues that sector
support, as opposed to project lending, is most suitable when the institutional capacity
is weak. The reasoning behind ECON' s conc1usion is that a large number of
uncoordinated projects is a larger administrative burden than a coordinated sector
program. The World Bank (1995) reasons along the same lines, but nevertheless
emphasizes the importance of institutional capacity as a key to ownership and success
of sector programs. The Bank's sugge sted solution is to build capacity as part and
parcel of the sector investment program.
When sector investment programs are introduced in countries with weak institutional
capacity, there is a danger that donor coordination means that the donors more or less
6 In 1994, government consumption relative to GDP was 13 percent in all developing countries, 10
percent in least developed countries, 17 percent in sub-Saharan Africa and 17 percent in industrial
countries (UNDP 1997). The corresponding development assistance as share of GDP was 1.4 percent
in all developing countries, 17.5 in least developed eountries and 12.6 percent in sub-Saharan Africa
(UNDP 1997). Total public expenditure was about 10 percent of GDP in Europe in 1880 (and
government consumption was less than that), when it had a comparable income level with today's
developing countries.
7 The optimal size of public expenditure is reached when the marginal eost of raising the extra revenue
equals the socIal benefits of the extra expenditure.
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take over the policy formulation and even the running of the sector in question.
Donors thus gain much more influence than their contribution to the sector warrants.
If both institutional capacity and donor coordination are weak, sector programs easily
end up as an exercise in lumping together existing projects under new headings on the
planning ministry' s (or planning division in the ministry of finance) computerized
project database, and little else.
From this discussion we conc1ude that if local ownership is a priority consideration,
general budget or sector support should be given when the recipient has adequate
institutional capacity. Although we accept the argument that a coordinated sector
program is a lesser administrative burden than a large number of uncoordinated
projects, we would argue that it is better to limit the number of projects than to
introduce sector programs in countries with very weak institutional capacity. Donors
should in this case scale the total number of projects and the total amount of transfers
to the absorption capacity of the recipient. When financial and institutional capacity
is weak, donor coordination should probably be concentrated in the area of financial
viability analysis as discussed above. In addition, debt relief could be considered an
alternative to sector support in the case of weak capacity (see sections 3.1.2 and 3.2).
2.5 Summary and conclusions
A paradox related to development aid demonstrated in this section, is that aid appears
to be most effective and efficient when it seems to be the least needed. The stronger
the institutional capacity, the greater the absorption capacity for external capital
inflows. This applies whether inflows are offcial or private, and irrespective of the
form the development aid is given in. Weak institutional capacity goes hand in hand
with low absorption capacity and low returns to investment, and again whether aid is
given in the form of project lending/grants or program lending/grants. Capacity
building, inc1uding accumulation of human capital and institutional infrastructure,
therefore seems to be a key to success. This is usually a lengthy process, and it is not
clear exactly how external assistance may accelerate it. Nevertheless, some general
principles have been highlighted in this discussion:
. New investment projects should be approved only if existing investments are in
good working condition.
. Borrowing should not take place unless the expected rate of return on the
investment is at least as high as the cost of obtaining the resources.
. The total share of government consumption in GDP should be an important
consideration when project and program aid are planned.
. The better the recipient governments institutional capacity, the more it makes
sense to give loans and grants in the form of general budget or sector support.
3 How does budget support work?
A transfer has the same effect on the overall macroeconomic balance regardless of the
form it is given in. The channels through which the economy adjusts to the transfer
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are, however, different depending on the exchange rate regime and the form the
transfer is given in. Consequently, the conditionalities attached to a transfer should be
different depending on the macroeconomic context. We therefore focus on some
basic macroeconomic relations before we discuss the paricular conditions suggested
in the terms of reference for this report. Consider the macro-economic identity:
T-G + S-I == X-M + NTR + NINT
Where T is government revenue, G is government expenditure, S is private savings, I
is private investment, X is exports of goods and services, M is imports of goods and
services, NTR is net transfers from abroad and NINT is net interest payments and
remittances from abroad. The right-hand side of the identity represents the current
account on the balance of payment, or the external balance, while the left-hand side
represents the internal balance. The identity implies that a government budget deficit
combined with a savings/investment deficit in the private sector necessarily come with
a deficit on the current account of the balance of payment.
The identity can be interpreted as follows:
1. If we keep the domestic private investment - savings balanee constant, there is a
one to one relationship between the government budget deficit and the current
account deficit. Thus, a milLion-:dollar increase in the government budget deficit
widens the current account deficit by one million. Or equivalently, a million-
dollar increase in transfers in the form of budget support narrows both the internal
and the external balance by one millon if government expenditure is kept constant.
2. ff we keep the current account deficit and private savings constant, there is a one to
one relationship between private investment and the government deficit. Thus, if
the government deficit increases by one millon, it is financed by private savings
and private investment dec1ines with one million.
This is of course a mechanistic way of analyzing the macroeconomic impact of
general budget support. It does not take the dynamics of the adjustment process into
account. Nevertheless, the identity always holds and is a good starting point for the
analysis. It is immediately clear that a government deficit crowds out either local
investment or net exports, or a combination of both. ff the budget deficit is large
compared to GDP and sustained, private investment may be insufficient to generate or
sustain an income leve! compatible with a minimum leve! of welfare. Furthermore, it
may lead to a permanent balance of payment crisis. These are important insights. The
relations represented by the identity imply that balance of payment problems may
arise from fiscal problems and are not necessarily rooted in international trade
conditions.
The ESAF countries typically face credit constraints in the international financial
market. The prevailng current account deficit can no longer be financed through the
international financial market. The ESAF programs are designed to reduce
macroeconomic imbalances. They aim at narowing the left-hand side gap of the
identity above through an increase in T, an increase in S and a reduced level of G.
Such measures narow the external imbalance by the same amount through
mechanisms explained below. However, since there are few measures that directly
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influence private savings,8 and since increased tax revenue is limited by both a narow
tax base and administrative capacity (Fjeldstad 1995), it may take time to narrow the
gaps demonstrated by the identity through T and S. The burden of adjustment then
often falls on G and I to a larger extent than desirable. The credit facilities from the
IMF and bilateral grants and concessionar loans are usually given in order to avoid
this outcome.
The following sections analyze the macroeconomic impact of budget support given to
a country under an ESAF program under different assumptions on the exchange rate
regime and the degree of international capital mobility. When donor funds are
fungible, the analysis also applies to sector investment programs. We start with the
common case of fixed exchange rates and relatively low capital mobility. Next, we
demonstrate the case with flexible exchange rates and a relatively low degree of
capital mobilty. We provide a stepwise analysis of the adjustment process - first the
automatic adjustments to a transfer and next the additional policy adjustments
incorporated in the ESAF program - staring with a situation where the
macroeconomic imbalances are unsustainable.
3.1 Fixed exchange rate, low capital mobilty
A transfer in the fixed exchange rate, low capital mobility regime has the following
impact: 10
. Disposable income increases and aggregate demand with it.
. The interest rate dec1ines and prïvate investment increases as a consequence.
. Import demand increases as a result of the increase in total demand. Exports are
unaffected. Therefore the trade deficit increases.
. Money supply increases.
The magnitude of the changes depends on the degree of capital mobility. In the
extreme case when capital is perfectly mobile, the transfer wil have no effect on
interest rates, investment, or income. This is because the transfer adds to money
supply which in turn puts a downward pressure on interest rates. A lower interest rate
than the rest of the world is not possible with perfeet capital mobility and the transfer
wil simply flow out again seeking higher returns elsewhere. In countries with a high
degree of "capital flight," therefore, a transfer is equivalent with debt relief.
When capital mobility is low, on the other hand, a larger portion of the transfer
remains in the country. The effects listed above are stronger the less mobile is capita!.
The transfer adds to foreign reserves which is part of the money supply. An increase
in money supply is compatible with a fixed exchange rate and no additional
8 A higher real interest rate usually helps when finaneial markets are reasonably developed, but higher
interest rates also reduce investment. The interest rate should in any case be positive in real terms in
order to mobilize local savings and discourage unproductive investments.
9 We define low capital mobility as the case where the balance of payments curve is steeper than the
balance in the money market curve in a typical Keynesian macro model for an open economy.
10 The analysis is based on a standard Keynesian macro mode!.
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intlationar pressure if the supply side responds to the stimulus from the demand side.
If it do es not - if for example a lower interest rate fails to generate additional
investments, the increased demand and money supply is more like1y to lead to an
increase in the rate of intlation.
From the list above, we can see that a transfer has one and possibly two effects which
are contrar to the ESAF objectives, namely the widening of the trade deficit and a
possible increase in the rate of intlation. The policy measures necessar to improve
the external and intern al balanee then become even more important in the presence of
transfers. We therefore turn to a discussion of a typical ESAF program in a regime
with fixed exchange rates and low capital mobilty.
3.1.1 ESAF and budget support
Consider a situation where there is initially a large government deficit and an
unsustainable current account deficit. So far the current account deficit has been
financed through short-term debt rescheduling, arears and other ad hoc arangements
with creditors. Further, assume that the local financial markets are thin such that the
government deficit has been largely monetized, leading to a relatively high rate of
intlation. This country enters an ESAF agreement with the IMF and bilateral donors
support the adjustment process by providing budget support or sector investment
programs. Let us finally assume that the budget support and/or SIPs are initiated
immediately after the ESAF has been agreed, and hence before any policy measures
have taken effect. This is in fact the usual order of events (Abed et. a. 1998).
As explained above the budget support or SIP leads to an increase in aggregate
demand, an increase in local investment and a larger trade deficit. It is also a danger
that intlation may increase if the investment response to a lower interest rate is weak.
The effect on the trade balance and the possible intlationary impact are undesirable
and contrar to the objectives of the ESAF. Therefore, additional policy measures are
necessary in order to obtain the objectives of the ESAF. These measures can be
divided into two major categories:
1. Measures that improve the workings of the market;
2. Measures that regulate aggregate demand and the composition of demand.
The first category relates to removing distortions and introducing or improving
institutions such that for example investors resp ond to the investment opportunities
that arise from a lower interest rate. Or such that producers resp ond to the export
opportunities that arise from a devaluation of the exchange rate (discussed below) and
improved access to foreign markets. Such measures reduce the probability that higher
demand or improved termsof trade generate intlation rather than a supply side
response.
The second category relates to fiscal and monetary policy, trade policy and also
exchange rate policy. Monetar policy has no impact on aggregate demand in the case
of fixed exchange rates (see the appendix). Money supply does, however have an
impact on intlation. This is the reason why ESAF programs emphasize the need for a
12
switch in financing of the government budget deficit from "printing money" to foreign
financing.
Bringing monetization of the budget deficit to an end is only a first step towards
stabilization, however. In fact, foreign reserves contribute to the money supp1y as
well. Reserves are more easily absorbed through increased imports, however, and
thus less inflationary than monetization of the budget deficit.
In the long run the deficit net of transfers has to be reduced in order to obtain a stable
macroeconomic environment. As pointed out above, the budget deficit as a share of
GDP was on average c10se to 14 percent prior to the ESAF programs. In most of the
countries it is not possible to narrow the deficit to sustainable levels from the revenue
side alone, and budget cuts are therefore necessar. A reduction in government
expenditure is a fiscal policy measure and has the following effects:
. Lower aggregate demand;
. Lower interest rate and therefore a higher rate of private investment;
. Improved trade balance;
. Lower money supply (given low capital mobilty);
Taking the transfer and the tighter fiscal policy together, both stimulate investment,
which is a good thing for future income leveIs. A tighter fiscal policy helps reduce the
trade deficit which was a problem before the ESAF program and which was further
aggravated by the transfer. Fiscal policy is usually not tight enough to counterbalance
the effect the transfer had on the trade balance. After all the transfer was given to be
spent in the first place. In the case of import support, it is even given to be spent on
imports. Further measures are therefore necessar in order to improve the trade
balance. A devaluation of the local currency is then the most commonly
recommended policy measure.i A devaluation wil improve local producers' terms
of trade both on the domestic and foreign markets. Imports become more expensive
and local producers can better compete with imports on the local market, and they are
able to export more.
Table 3.1 Structural adjustment in a fixed exchange rate regime
Transfer Cut in public Devaluation
expenditure
Aggregate demand + - +
Interest rate - - +
Trade balance - + +
Inflation Oor+ O or- Oor+
The policy analysis is summarized in table 3.1 where the columns represent policy
measures and the rows represent the policy objectives. Each cell shows the impact on
the policy measure on the policy objective. Zero indicates that the policy measure is
neutral in respect to the policy objective in question.
11 The exehange rate is fixed after the devaluation, but at a higher leve! (it takes more local currency to
buy a dollar).
13
The policy objectives of the ESAFs are to bring down inflation, improve the external
balance and increase aggregate output. Table 3.1 clearly ilustrates the difficulties of
obtaining all three objectives at the same time. In all four rows there are both + and -,
and the net impact is ambiguous. The policy measure that comes c10sest to having a
positive impact on all policy objectives is devaluation of the exchange rate. However,
if the distortions and bottlenecks in the economy are such that producers are not able
to resp ond to the stimulus represented by improved terms of trade, the effect of a
devaluation would be undermined by inflation.
This discussion underlines the points we made in section 2 about the need to scale the
transfers to the absorption capacity of the recipient government. Otherwise there is a
danger that transfers jeopardize the attainment of policy objectives other than
increasing aggregate demand. When the institutional capacity within the government
as well as the economy as a whole is weak, this is not an unlikely outcome. Debt
reduction could in that case be considered as an alternative to budget/import/sector
support. This would be equivalent to a transfer combined with policy conditions to
the effect that public expenditure should not increase and the trade balance should not
deteriorate.
3.2 Flexible exchange 'ates, low capital mobilty
The impact of a transfer from abroad is more complex in the flexible exchange rate
regime:
. Disposable income and aggregate demand increases.
. The impact on the interest rate depends on how much of the transfer is saved. The
more is saved, the more likely it is that the transfer willead to a decline in interest
rate.
. The impact on the exchange rate is ambiguous.
An increase in supply of foreign exchange leads to an immediate appreciation of the
exchange rate. However, as the adjustment process unfolds, the negative impact on the
trade balance (similar to what we saw with fixed exchange rates) is corrected by a
depreciation of the local currency. In other words, the adjustment made through a
devaluation in the case of fixed exchange rates takes place automatically in the case
with flexible exchange rates. The net effect depends on how businesses and
households resp ond to changes in relative prices and has to be estimated in each case.
3.2.1 ESAF and budget support
Assume that the initial situation and the objectives of the ESAF are the same as in
section 3.1.1. A reduction in government expenditure in order to improve the intern al
(and external) balance has a different impact compared to the case with fixed
exchange rates:
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. Aggregate demand dec1ines, but the more mobile is capital the less the impact on
aggregate demand.
. The interest rate dec1ines, but the more mobile is capital the less the impact,
. The exchange rate appreciates if the capital mobility is low and depreciates if
capital mobility is high.
In the case of flexible exchange rates, monetary policy is the most efficient II
controlling aggregate demand. A tighter monetar policy has the following impact:
. Aggregate demand declines;
. The interest rate goes up;
. The exchange rate appreciates.
Table 3.2 Structural adjustment in a flexible exchange rate regime
Transfer Cut in public Tighter monetary
expenditure Doliev
Aggregate demand +
- (small) -
Interest rate -
- (small) +
Exehange rate ? + +
Trade balance - - ?
Inflation Oor+ O or- O or-
As seen from table 3.2 macroeconomic policy is more complex in the case of flexible
exchange rates. Note that the adjustment process through monetar policy is harsher
in the sense that it takes a greater toll on aggregate demand than a combination of
fiscal policy and a devaluation did in the case of fixed exchange rates. If the trade
balance improves in this case, it does so more from a reduction in imports than an
increase in exports.
Finally, it should be noted that although a fixed exchange rate regïme may seem more
favorable than a flexible exchange rate regime, the fixed exchange rate can only be
sustained as long as the market has confidence in the regime. Otherwise the country
wil be forced to devalue or a paralleI market develops. Finally the positive effects of
a devaluation in a fixed exchange rate regime ar~ often undermined by inflation.
3.3 Summary and conclusions
The effects of the macroeconomic policy conditions related to ESAF programs depend
on the exchange rate regime. They should therefore be designed as a package where
the effects of the policy measures are balanced against each other. Only then is it
possible to first stabilze the economy and then create an environment for subsequent
increases in income and welfare. It should be noted that the policy objectives of
stabilization and expansion might be internally inconsistent in the short run. This is
particularly the case when the exchange rate is flexible and monetar policy tight. It
should further be noted that the donor transfers affect the macroeconomic variables,
of ten in the opposite direction as the objectives of the ESAF program. For example,
transfers lead to a widening of the trade deficit, which needs to be counterbalanced by
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a depreciation of the exchange rate or demand management. In addition transfers may
lead to a downward pressure on the interest rates and entail inflationar pressure,
while the ESAF programs aim at reducing inflation and increase the interest rate at
least to alevel where the real interest rate is positive. Therefore, the total amount of
transfers needs to be taken into account when the macroeconomic policy measures are
designed.
On this background we recommend that macroeconomic conditions are left to two
central decision makng bodies, which should be the government and the central bank
of the recipient country in cooperation with the IMF. Bilateral donors should not
impose additional conditions as far as macroeconomic policy conditions are
concerned.
4 An example: Tanzania
This section ilustrates the discussion in section 3.2 with flexible exchange rates. As
discussed above, the impact of transfers and a typical ESAF program is more complex
and less predictable in such a trade regime than in a fixed exchange rate regime. A
numerical example is therefore provided in order to ilustrate the relative importance
of the effects of the transfer and the policy measures. The example chosen is
Tanzania. It has a flexible exchange rate and capital mobility appears to be fairly
high.12 We apply a Keynesian macroeconomic model for the Tanzanian economy
(Macmod) for the exercise.13
As a benchmark we use a base line scenarÏo with "business as usuaL." In the Tanzania
case this means a rather tight monetary and fiscal policy. The baseline scenario also
incorporates the impact of unfavorable weather conditions in 1997 and a recovery in
1998.
Westar by running a scenario in which foreign transfers to the government is
increased by 10 percent compared to the base line scenario each year between 1998
and 2001. We assume that the transfer is used for financing the government budget
deficit, and that the share of the deficit financed by the transfer would otherwise had
been financed by money-creating bank borrowing. The net impact on money supply is
therefore zero. Finally, we assume thatpublic expenditure is unchanged compared to
the base line scenario. As should be expected from the discussion in section 3, the
transfer in this case has no impact on aggregate demand, the interest rate or the
exchange rate. The only thing that happens is, a narowing of the internal and external
balance by the amount transferred. On the balance of payment this is seen as an
improvement on the current account which stems directly from the transfer and a
reduction on exceptional financing "below the line" on the overall balance of
payment. The latter also stems directly form the transfer. In other words, the transfer
is equivalent to debt relief.
12 The capital mobility parameter was estimated by calibrating the mode! to the three most recent years
for which a full set of data is avaIlable. The average for these three years is used for projeetions.
13 Macmod has been developed by CM! for, and in cooperation with, the Planning Commssion in
Tanzania. See Nordås (1998) for a full description of the mode!.
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This was probably not a very interesting case, but demonstrates that the macro model
behaves according to theory predictions. Our first alternative scenario introduces an
attempt to reduce the imbalances in the economy net of transfers. The adjustment
process is undertaken mainly on the fiscal side. Government consumption is reduced
compared to the base line scenario. In addition there is a gradual increase in indirect
taxes. Money supply is unchanged compared to the base line scenario. This may call
for the Bank of Tanzania to sterilze parts of the transfer if it exceeds what the
government would otherwise have financed through money creation.
In our second alternative scenario, the adjustment is mainly taken on the monetar
side. Government expenditure is unchanged compared to the base line scenario.
However, we maintain the assumption of an increase in local indirect taxes, since this
is already in the pipeline in the country.
Stabilzation of the economy, which first and foremost involves getting inflation under
control has been and stil is of utmost importance in Tanzania and other ESAF
countries. All three scenarios are therefore run with a policy mix that brings inflation
down from about 15 percent by the end of 1997 to about 7 percent in 2001.14
The exogenous assumptions are presented in table 4.1 and the main results in figures
4.1 - 4.4
Table 4.1 Policy assumptions
1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01
Transfers to govt.
Base line 200 200 200 180Alternative 1 and 2 220 220 220 198
Government eonsumptionBase line 2 2 2.5 30Alternative 1 O O O OAlternative 2 2 2 2.5 3
Indirect taxes (local)
Base line 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5Alternative land 2 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5
Monev supplv 1998 1999 2000 2001
Base line 12.1 11. 9.3 8.7Alternative 1 12.7 12.1 10.1 9.4Alternative 2 13.2 10.1 7.9 6.9
Note: Transfers to government are given at mil. USD, government consumption as percentage
increase from one year to the next, indirect taxes are presented as a share of GDP and money supply
is presented as percentage change in M2 compared to the previous year. Money supply is given for
calendar years white the other variables are given for fiscal years.
14 This is in faet above the stated target of about 5 percent inflation by the year 2000.
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Figure 4.1
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As expected, a tighter fiscal policy has a negative impact on aggregate demand and
economic growth is lower in the alternative scenario than in the base line scenario.
Also as indicated earlier, monetar policy is the most powerful instrument in
regulating aggregate demand in a flexible exchange rate regime. Therefore,
alternative 2 where the Bank of Tanzania pursues a tight monetar policy mainly in
order to curb inflation, has a negative side-effect on aggregate demand. This is the
case even when public expenditure is unchanged compared to the base line scenario.
Alternative 2 thus yields the lowest growth rate of the three scenarios. This result
underlines the importance of fiscal discipline in a country with flexible exchange
rates. In the absence of such discipline, the burden of adjustment has to be taken from
the monetar side, which proves to be much more negative for the national income
than adjustment from the fiscal side.
The real interest rate is presented in figure 4.2. As expected, it dec1ines as a
consequence of tighter fiscal policy and increases as a result of tighter monetar
policy. However, note that the interest rate is high and increasing over time in all
three scenarios. This is due to the fact that bringing down inflation is a high priority
in Tanzania. In addition our modeling work suggests that private savings and
investment are not very sensitive to changes in the interest rate and strong measures
are therefore needed until the rate of inflation has stabilized at a sufficiently low leveL.
Figure 4.2
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The exchange rate is presented in figure 4.3. The difference between the three
scenarios are not very big, but the exchange rate depreciates compared to the base line
scenario in the tighter fiscal policy scenario and appreciates compared to the base line
scenario in the tighter monetar policy scenario.
Figure 4.3
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Figure 4.4 ilustrates the severity of the external imbalance problem. In spite of the
fact that the policy measures introduced are strong enough to have a significantly
negative impact on aggregate demand and national income, they are not strong enough
to reduce the external imbalance significantly over the four year projection period. It
could also be argued that even the base line scenario produce growth rates that falls
short of government as well as donor objectives. The tight fiscal policy scenario has
the largest positive impact on the external balance at the least cost in terms of lower
income growth. Recallng the discussion of the identity in section 3, this should not
be surprising. In a country where private savings and investments are not very
sensitive to changes in the interest rate due to thin financial markets, government
expenditure is more likely to crowd out net exports than private investment.
Figure 4.4
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This section has ilustrated the macroeconomic policy options and tradeoffs facing a
government during the adjustment process. The following conclusions can be drawn
from the analysis:
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. In a policy regime of flexible exchange rates and weak fiscal discipline, aid in the
form of debt relief could be considered.
. Adjustment is least painful in terms of loss of national income when public
expenditure takes the burden of adjustment.
. Reallocation of public expenditure towards growth-enhancing and welfare-
improving areas wil further reduce the burden of adjustment.
5 The criteria for budget and sector support
This section discusses each group of suggested criteria separately. However, some
general guidelines should apply when setting criteria:
. They should relate to variables and measures over which the recipient has contro!.
. They should be measurable/verifiable, such that it can be determined with
certainty whether the criteria have been fulfiled or not.
. They should be internally consistent and consistent with the objectives of the
reform program.
In addition we argue that Norway should not insist on conditionalities in excess of
what is inc1uded in the Policy Framework Paper (PFP) for countries subject to ESAF
programs. As argued above, additional conditions would increase the administrative
burden of the recipient country, and could even unintentionally undermine the ESAF
program. It is therefore better to raise eventual concerns within the IMF than impose
additional conditions.
5.1 Good governanee
The following criteria are suggested:
. The country should observe international agreements on human rights;
. The country should be a democracy, or at least in a process of democratization;
. The country should be fighting corruption.
These are criteria suitable for selecting recipient countries of Norwegian aid in
general, irrespective of the form in which aid is given (except perhaps emergency aid).
5.2 Structural reforms
The criteria suggested under this heading are:
. The country must have entered an agreement wïth the IMF on structural reforms;
. There must exist a PFP which summarizes the country' s policies on social and
economic reforms and lays out the structural reforms which the donors have agreed
to fund.
. The government must be comrtted to the above mentioned agreements.
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The two first points are internally dependent. Thus, an ESAF program with the IMF
is manifested in a PFP negotiated between IMF staff and the recipient country. The
IMF executive board, where all IMF member countries are represented, approves the
PFP (Fisher 1997). The third point on the list implies that the Norwegian government
reserves the right to evaluate independently whether the recipient government is
committed to the reform program. A footnote related to this point gives some
examples of evaluation criteria. Here economic growth is included as a criterion.
However, growth is a variable which is not under the control of the government. It is
therefore not inc1uded as a condition in the ESAF programs, but appears as a policy
objective (Fisher 1997). We therefore recommend that growth is not introduced as a
conditionfor Norwegian budget or sector support.
On the basis of the general discussion above and in section 2, we think that Norway
should not impose additional economic policy conditions when there is an ESAF
program in place. These criteria in turn can be reduced to the first point on the list,
namely that the country must have entered an agreement with the IMF.
There is a possibility that Norway wants to support countries currently not under an
agreement with the IMF. The only time this is defendable is when the potential
recipient needs temporal support, has a considerable administrative and institutional
capacity and has areasonably balanced economy. An examp1e of such a country is
South Africa. It should, however, be noted that such countries have access to the
international financial market at reasonably good terms of borrowing.
5.3 The budget proeess
The following criteria are suggested:
. The recipient country must have a coordinated budget process established within
responsible deparments. The budget process should entaIl the entire public
sector. The budget process must facilitate the operationalization of priorities.
. A process aiming at incorporating all donor funding in the budget must have been
initiated.
. The budget process must be linked to a multiyear budget. This should contain a
framework for long-term planning and the extrapolation of future current
expenditure resulting from investment projects. At least such a framework must
be under preparation.
. There must be a system, which ensures that budgeted funds are disbursed to
spending agencies.
. There must be a system in place, which ensures that each spending agency adheres
to the budget ceilngs and that embezzlements are prevented.
We agree that a condition for getting budget support is that the budget process is
sound and transparent. Further, the budget should be an instrument for management
of the public sector as well as a fiscal policy instrument. We would also argue that all
too often donors have accepted lax budgetar control because of the recipient' s
institutional weakess. There are, however, examples of countries and institutions,
which with small resources have managed to establish accountability and sound
21
administrative systems. The Botswana planning system is a case in point (see Nordås,
Sekgoma and Somolekae 1998). Another case is the Bank of Tanzania, which has
been "right-sized" and its performance has improved tremendously over the past four
years. In both cases there has been commtted and competent (local) leadership. And
not least, the right incentives seem to have been in place.
The budgetar system and the budgetar process vary a lot among countries, both in
developed and developing countries. Thus, there exist many different systems which
are working well both as management tools for the public sector and as an instrument
for the implementation of fiscal policy. Which system is in place in a given country
depends on history and tradition,15 the size of the country, the ethnic, economic and
cultural diversity of the country, and how the division of labor between state and
market is seen in the country. Hence, countries differ regarding the relation between
central and local government, whether they have one-year or multyear budgets and
what is incorporated into the budget. There is no conc1usive evidence that one
paricular system is superior under all circumstances. Therefore, the criteria regarding
the budget process should relate to general principles of transparency and
accountability rather than insisting on particular systems and procedures. In the
following we wil discuss each point on the list above:
5.3.1 Coordinated budget proeess
This criterion deals with the scope of the central government budget. A general
principle is that it should be comprehensive and incorporate all the inflows and
outflows to the central government. This prInciple has, however, turned out to be
impractical and no country even in the OECD adheres to it (OECD 1995). Areas of
particular difficultes and differences among countries are the following:
. State enterprises;
. local government;
. loans and grants provided by the government to the private sector; and
. social security.
The boundaries between private and public enterprises are sometimes not clear-cut.
There are public1y owned enterprises which are run as autonomous entities subject to
the same conditions as private enterprises. And there are public enterprises which
have a role in public administrative management. Usually net flows to the latter type
of enterprises are inc1uded in the central government budget. In countrIes where state
enterprises are a drain on government resources, there is most likely a privatization
program in place as part of the ESAF agreement, and this should suffice as a condition
for budget support in this area.
Transfers to local government are usually inc1uded in the central government budget.
In many cases such resources are earmarked for paricular sectors such as primary
education and health care. However, local government expenditure and own revenue
from local sources are usually not incorporated into the central government budget.
15 The colonial past is often decisive for which budgetary system and processes are established.
22
Primary education and health care are among the major sectors receiving donor
support. The administration of these sectors is usually decentralized to the local
government. Weak local government administrative capacity is therefore a
particularly serious problem for donors focusing on these sectors. The British ODA
has taken the approach not to finance programs managed at local government leve! in
cases where the administrative capacity is very weak. In cases where the
administrative capacity is better, financing has been provided in paralleI with capacity
building assistance (ODA 1996). We believe that the British approach is
commendable. It involves a judgement on the effcient use of donor money without
imposing conditions on how the recipient country should organize its budget as far as
the relation between local and central government is concerned.
Loans and loan guarantees from the central government to the private sector or public
enterprises impose paricular problems in the budget process. On the one hand the
payment of loans is an outlay on the par of the government and contributes to the
overall deficit. On the other hand, loans are paid back in due course and may not
constitute a drain on public resources in a longer time perspective. A solution in some
OECD countries is to include only the subsidy element of the loan or loan guarantee
in the budget (OECD 1995). Again there is no consensus on how loans should be
treated in the budget, and it is therefore difficult to recommend a particular condition
on this issue.
Finally, special or trust funds usually finance social security such as pensions and
other transfers to individuals. Eventual transfers from central government to these
funds are usually inc1uded in the budget, but not payments from the funds.
We have sketched some areas of particular difficulties related to the scope of
government budgeting. In developing countries in transition from a state-led planned
development strategy to a rnarket-based development strategy, these difficulties are of
paricular relevance. We have also emphasized that there are no universal solutions to
these problems. Four criteria on whether a budget is sufficiently comprehensive are
however sugge sted by the OECD (1995):
1. It should facilitate the measurement of the economic consequences of government
actions.
2. It should facilitate the control of the financial resources of the government.
3. Is should facilitate accountabilty of decision-makers and managers in the public
sector.
4. It should facilitate the effcient use of public resources.
These are general criteria which we believe are universaL. They are, however, not
easily operationalized into a set of conditionalities. We therefore suggest that these
criteria should provide guidance during the process of selecting countries and sectors
for sector support.
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5.3.2 Incorporating all donor funds
A precondition for the budget working as a management tool is that the public sector
is manageable, and that the ministry of finance has full information on the operations
of the public sector. In order to fulfil this precondition, both donors and the
government in the recipient countries have some way to go. First, as argued above,
donors have in many cases contributed to the establishment of a public sector which is
too big to be sustained from local resources. When this is the case, the scaling back,
or even 1eveling off of donor transfers wil leave the recipient government in a
position of crisis management. This is not a situation where good planning systems
are likely to emerge. Second, as emphasized by the World Bank (1995), the central
government in the recipient country is of ten unaware of the existence of a large
number of donor-funded projects. This is to a large extent because donors feel that
their funds are better utilized if they are disbursed directly to the local government in
the area where the project is implemented. Quite of ten neither the local government
nor the donor inform the ministry of finance on the ongoing project. Third, when
donors deal with the central government, each donor has its own systems and
procedures of project preparation, documentation, disbursement and accounting.
When many donors are involved, this is a heavy burden on the administrative capacity
of the recipient government.
Our experience from working as consultants and advisors to African ministries of
finance indicates that it is often difficult to access the necessar information from
donors during the budget process. This is paricularly the case when multiyear
budgets are bein g prepared. Few donors have been wiling to release information
about grants and loans planned over the next few years. This is often because the
donors themselves do not have multiyear budgets and therefore do not know how
much their parliaments wil grant. Furthermore, some of the donors who do provide
information on how much funding they wil make available to the recipient
government, do not actually disburse the declared amount. Therefore, some recipient
countries have developed rules of thumb on the basis of past experience on how much
of the funding dec1ared by each donor wil actually come forth.16 Thus, they
incorporate in the budget what they expect to receive, not what the donor declares it
wil disburse.
Makng the budget a management tool comprising all the resources available to the
government in question requires some improvement of the exchange and flow of
information both on the part of recipients and donors. We therefore recommend that
donors and recipients of budget and sector support work on systems and routines for
incorporating all donor funds in the budget as par of the capacity building process.
5.3.3 Multiyear budgets
Donors differ regarding whether to introduce multiyear budgets (MYB) as a condition
for sector support. The Netherlands insists on multiyear "rollng" budgets and argue
that this is the only way that the recipient government can make commitments to an
expanding contribution to the sector program. Denmark and the UK do not mention
16 Norway usually provides the necessary information.
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MYBs in their sector investment program documents, while Sweden states that the
policy for the SIDA-supported sector should be inc1uded in the recipient country's
"forward budgeting process," without elaborating.
MYBs were first introduced in OECD countries in the 1960s (OECD 1995). They
were introduced as a planning de vice in order to identify programs and set aside
funding for them. Early MYBs took a bottom-up approach and soon developed into
engines of expansion as the spending agencies saw them as entitlements to future
increases in resources (Keating and Rosalky 1990, OECD 1995). As further
expansion of the public sector in the OECD area became unsustainable, MYBs were
considered an inappropriate approach to public sector management. In recent years,
however, MYBs have seen a renaissance. This time they are used as instruments for
constraining future spending, and usually take a top-down approach. This means that
the ministry of finance estimates the total resources available for government
expenditure over the next few years. This is done on the basis of macroeconomic
forecasts, estimated tax and non-tax revenue, grants and loans, and norms and targets
for the development of the overall budget deficit.
In some countries the MYB process stops here. Hence, the MYB only incorporate
targets for overall government expenditure and the budget deficit. The targets for
overall expenditure are either expressed in terms of percentage real growth or as a
percentage of GDP. The target for the budget deficit is usually expressed as a share of
GDP.
In other countries the MYB process is taken one step further. Overall resources
available for expenditure are allocated among sectors and votes on a fairly aggregate
leve! according to priorities and policies. This facilitates the operationalization of the
central government' s policy objectïves of restructuring the public sector and a
redefinition of the role of government. It sends c1ear signals to the spending agencies
as to the trend and direction of their activity leveIs, and gives them time to adjust.
A further step in the MYB process is to inc1ude elements of a bottom-up approach.
Usually this is 1imited to extrapolating the cost of continuing existing programs and
the current expenditure stemming from existing investments. The bottom-up part thus
shows the cost of maintaining the current responsibilities and functions of the
government. The gap between this estimate and the top-down estimate shows how
much room there is for new programs, or how much of existing programs must be
phased out. In a structural adjustment situation the phasing out of projects and
programs and the reallocation of scarce resources are usually what is required. For
this purpose, the top-down approach, inc1uding a broad sector allocation of resources
is probably useful.
The extent to which the multïyear expenditure ceilings have actually translated into
the budget ceilngs for the annual budget differs among both developed and
developing countries.
The merits of the MYB approach depend crucially on the quality of the
macroeconomic forecasts made. This in turn depends on the nature of the economy in
question. If it is a relatïvely stable economy with productïve sectors not too
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vulnerable to weather conditions and other factors over which the economic agents
have little or no control, the quality depends on analytical capacity and the flow of
information. ff the economy is very vulnerable to exogenous shocks on the other
hand, forecasts are not likely to provide much guidance.
In most countries at least three quarers of total expenditure in any year is already
committed by law, agreements or otherwise. The degree of freedom for future
expenditure is therefore limited. This is a factor that has to be taken into account
before deciding whether to commit scarce administrative capacities to multi-year
budgeting. When the country in question is operating mainly at a level of crisis
management, there is no degree of freedom whatsoever. Thus, some countries with
severe intern al and external imbalances have had to limit expenditure at any point in
time to what is actually collected from domestic revenue and grants on a monthly or
quarterly basis (often this is a condition imposed by the IMF). Under these
circumstances, the spending agencies are not even sure what they can spend next
month. It therefore makes little sense to introduce comprehensive multiyear budgets
in such a situation.
Multiyear budgets have been most successful when used as a top-down instrument for
government expenditure restraint. The bottom-up approach in contrast, tended to
enhance public sector expansion. We conc1ude that experience with MYBs has been
mixed. We can therefore not recommend that MYB should be a condition for
receiving budget or sector support. A minimum requirement should, however, be that
there is a financial viability assessment, as discussed in section 2.1.
5.3.4 Budget implementation
The two last points on the list of conditions under the budget process relate to
expenditure contro!. The conditions imply that the budget is actually an instrument
for public sector management and that the spending agencies are accountable.
Further, the conditions imply that there is a dose relation between the budget and the
audited government accounts.
In our view these are the most crucial and important conditions together with the
ESAF macroeconomic policy conditions. Thus, there is little gain from creating
sophisticated plans and multiyear budgets (with substantial donor technical support) if
there is not a system in place for the effective implementation of the plans. We
therefore recommend that developing systems for implementation and performance
monitoring should be made the top priority in the sector support and budget support
programs. Monthly flash reports on expenditure and revenue collections developed in
cooperation with the ministry of finance and the central bank are useful instruments in
this respect, provided that they are reasonably reliable. This is a first step that controls
expenditure and cash flows only. A further step is to introduce performance
indicators in order to control performance as well. We discuss these issues further
under the next heading related to accountability and auditing.17
17 See also Abedian, Ajam and Walker (1997) for a discussion of the South Afriean approaeh.
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5.4 Accounting and auditing
The suggested conditions related to accounting and auditing are as follows:
. The recipient country must have an accounting system which corresponds to the
budget system. Accounts must be prepared shortly after the fiscal year has ended.
. The sectors which receive Norwegian sector support must establish systems for
reporting results and transactions in such away that it is possible to undertake
sound and complete accounting and auditing. Such systems must at least be under
planning for the entire public sector
. The public sector accounts must incorporate all public sector activities and give an
accurate picture of the public sector's expenditures and revenues. They must be
sufficiently detailed to show the resources available to the sector program in
question and the disbursements on each item.
. Discrepancies between the budget and the accounts should not reflect a systematic
lack of budget discipline.
. The government accounts must show at areasonable level of detail the funds
going to sectors not involved in sector programs.
. Auditing must be performed by an institution independent of the spending
agencies, inc1uding the ministry of finance. The audited accounts must be
prepared according to international standards and must be completed within a
reasonab1e period of time.
. Where the public sector undertakes off-budget activities, a consolidated budget
and accounting must be prepared.
As emphasized in section 4.3.4 above, delivery, accountability and transparency are
essential for public sector performance, and in the next instance the entire economy' s
performance. In our view, therefore, accountabilty should be an absolute
requirement, not only for the sector subject to sector programs, but the public sector as
a whole. Hence, we suggest that points 2, 3 and 5 on the dot-list above are combined
into one condition to the effect that the government accounts are timelyand show how
the public sector has spent its resources. These conditions should be strictly enforced.
The level of detail in the budget and in the accounts depends on the capacity of the
government and the budget system in place. In some countries there has been a shift
from itemized appropriations to block appropriations. This has been done in order to
introduce some flexibilty into the system. With greater flexibility it is possible to
introduce incentives for improved efficiency. When such systems are being
introduced and show promising results, the leve! of detail in the accounting process
has to take this into account.
5.5 Sector reports
The sugge sted criteria are the following:
. The responsible departments must prep are or plan to prep are performanee
indicators for the sector engaged in sector investment programs.
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. The responsible departments must prepare or plan to prepare a system for
reporting obtained results and achievements to donors. This system must as far as
possible correspond with the needs of the recipient country.
We have already emphasized the importance of accountabilty and transparency and
we repe at it here. The requirement that recipients prep are reports and performance
indicators should be made unconditional after a short period of time. However, the
reporting systems should be kept simple and the performance indicators shou1d be few
and easy to monitor. Finally, it is important that the performance indicators relate to
variables over which the government or the spending agent have control and that the
targets for the indicators are internally consistent. Recall the discussion in section 3
above about how the macroeconomic indicators are interrelated.
6 Summary and recommendations
In this report we have discussed the cònditions under which sector support and general
budget support should be given. We have assumed that the recipient country is under
an ESAF program with the IMF. We have argued that the conditions laid out in the
PFP, which outlines the ESAF program, are so comprehensive and interdependent,
that additional conditions on macroeconomic policy and budgetary procedures are
most likely to be counterproductive. We therefore suggest that the British and
Swedish approach of seleeting recipient country and sector on the basis of a careful
evaluation of the accountability and capacity of the recipient is applied. In addition,
the recipient governments policy objectives should be compatible with Norwegian
objectives related to sector and budget support.
We have argued that the suggested conditions regarding macroeconomic policy and
budget processes are too detailed and that they are likely to impose additional
procedures on the part of the recipient. However, there are certain universal criteria as
to what constitute good public sector management that should apply. These criteria
relate to transparency and accountability.
Further, we have argued that it is not possible to identify a particular budget process or
system, which is superior under all circumstances. We therefore suggest that the
criteria related to budgetar procedures should address accountability, transparency
and performance. In our view these are the most important of all the suggested
criteria, and should be emphasized and strengthened. This is because we believe that
incentives are very important for performance. Incentives for improved performance
in turn can only work in a system of accountabilty and transparency. Further, we
argue that lack of transparency and accountability has fostered a c1imate which has
protected vested interests at the expense of the development objectives of the country
in question. Experience shows that transparency and accountability can be achieved
within areasonable period of time (the 2-3 year period suggested), when the recipients
as well as the donors are committed to the task. Finally, we argue that the capacity to
account for funds is probably strongly and positively correlated to the capacity to use
funds effectively.
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Appendix
The modelon which the reasoning in section 3 is based is a simple Keynesian
macroeconomic model (IS-LM) for an open economy:
Fixed exchange rates:
The goods market (iS equation):
(Sy +M y)Y-IJ = G+X where Sy,M y -; O,lr .. O (l)
The money market (LM equation)
Lyy+Lrr=D+R where Ir..O (2)
The foreign exchange market:
-M yy+ Krr = -X where Kr -; O (3)
Where S represents savings, M imports, y aggregate demand or GDP, I is investment,
r is the interest rate G is government expenditure, X is exports, L is money demand, D
is money supply in terms of nominal domestic assets, R is foreign reserves, R+D is
money supply and K is net inflow of capital. The endogenous variables in the model
is the national income, y, and the interest rate, r. In addition the money supply is
determined by the other variables in the system, such that money supply is subordinate
to the fixed exchange rate. This rules out monetar policy as an instrument for
regulating aggregate demand.
Solving the system and differentiating with respect to the relevant policy measures
give the following results:
dy
=
Kr
;: O
dG Kr(Sy +My)-IrMy
dr My
-;0=
dG Kr(Sy +My)-IrMy
(4)
(5)
Note that an increase in government expenditure has no impact on aggregate demand
when capital mobility is zero.
Flexible exchange rates
The goods market (iS equation):
(Sy +My)y-Irr+(Me -X.)e=G where Xe-;O (6)
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The money market (LM equation)
Lyy+Lrr=D+R where Ir..O (2)
The foreign exchange market:
-Myy+Krr+(Me -X.)e=O where Me.. O (7)
A new endogenous variable, the exchange rate e given as local currency per USD is
introduced.
Differentiating the system with respect to the relevant policy variables yields the
following results:
Fiscal policy
dy =
dG
Lr
LrSy -LyKr +lrLy
::0 (8)
dr -Ly
LrS y - LyKr + IrLy
;:0 (9)dG
dr
-=OwhenK ~oodG r
de
dG
=
-(LyKr +lrMy)
(Me -X.)(LrSy -LyKr +IrLy)
(lO)
de M y Ly
-::0 if -..-dG K r Lr
e.g. an increase in public expenditure leads to a depreciation of the local currency if
the LM curve is steeper than the balance of payments curve, and capital is relatively
mobile.
Monetary policy
dy
d(D + R)
=
-(Kr+lr) ::0
(LrSy -LyKr +lrLy) (11)
dr Sy= ::0d(D+R) LrSy -LyKr +lrLy (12)
de
d (D + R)
=
-(IrMy +(Sy +My)Kr)
::0
(Me -Xe)(LrSy -LyKr +lrLy)
(13)
30
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Karl Rolf Pedersen for useful comments.
Referenees:
Abed, G.T, et. aL., 1998, "Fiscal reforms in low-income countries. Experience under
IMF-supported programs," Occasional Paper 160, IMF, Washington D.C.
Abedian, I, T. Ajam and L. Walker, 1997, Promises Plans & Priorities. South
Africa' s Emerging Fiscal Structures, Cape Town: IDASA
Barro, R, and X. Sala-i-Martin, 1995, "Economic Growth," New York: McGraw Hil
ECON, 1996, "Guidelines for the use ofprogramme assistance," Report no. 41/96.
Feyzioglu, T, V. Swaroop and M. Zhu, 1998, "A panel data analysis of the fungibility
of foreign aid," The World Bank Economic Review, voL. 12, no. 1, pp. 29-58.
Fisher, S., 1997, "Applied economics in action: IMF programs," The American
Economic Review, voL. 87, no. 2, pp. 23-27.
Fjeldstad, O.H., 1995, "Taxation and tax reforms in Tanzania: A survey," WP 1995:4,
Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.
International Monetar Fund, 1998, International Financial Statistes, May 1998,
Washington D.C.: IMF.
Jenkins, G. P., 1997, "Project analysis and the World Bank," The American Economic
Review, voL. 87, no. 2, pp. 38-42.
Jha, R, 1994, Macroeconomicsfor Developing Countries, London: Routledge.
Keating, M. and D. Rosalky, 1990, "Rolling expenditure plans: Australian experience
and prognosis," in Premchand, A. (ed), Government Financial Management
Issues and Country Studies, Washington D. c.: IM.
Killick, T., 1993, "Enhancing the cost-effectiveness of Africa's negotiations with its
creditors," in UNCTAD, 1993, International Monetary and Fiscal Issues for
the 1990s, New York: United Nations.
Lucas, Robert E. Jr 1993, "Makng a miracle". Econometrica, VoL. 61, No. 2, March,
pp.251-272.
Maddison, A, 1995, "Monitoring the world economy 1820-1992," Development
Centre Studies, Paris: OECD.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, 1996, "Sectoral Budget Support,"
November.
Nordås, H.K, 1998, "Macmod, a Macroeconomic model for the Tanzanian economy,"
R 1998:5, Chr. Michelsen Institute Report.
Nordås, H.K., G. Sekgoma and G. Somolekae, 1998, "Managing good fortune.
Macroeconomic management and the role of aid in Botswana," Report
submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
ODA, 1996, "Financing structural adjustment via the budget: ODA experience"
OECD, 1995, "Budgeting for results. Perspectives on public expenditure
management," Paris: OECD.
SIDA, 1995, "Sector programme support. Background document to SIDA strategy,"
lune.
Tanzi, V., 1990, "Fiscal policy for growth and stability in developing countries:
Selected issues," in Premchand, A (ed), Government Financial Management
Issues and Country Studies, Washington D. C.: IMF.
UNDP, 1997, Human Development Report 1997, New York: Oxford University Press.
31
White, H, 1992, "The macroeconomic impact of development aid: A critical survey,"
The Journal of Development Studies, vol. 28, no 2, pp. 163-240.
World Bank, 1995, "The broad sector approach to lending, Sector investment
programs. Report to the SPA donors meeting," World Bank, 19 ApriL.
32
